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Abstract 
 
 
This study will examine whether Russian labor is truly “quiescent” by examining general 
activity in Moscow from 2000 to 2014 and then focusing on white-collar union activity. 
The results indicate that over this period, the unions representing healthcare workers, 
teachers, and academics were very active and often achieved concessions from the 
government such as higher wages or changes to proposed reforms. These findings are 
important in the context of other post-communist states (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic) as they indicate that institutional differences like method of unionization and 
unions’ political involvement led to different results for white-collar unions in these 
countries.  Finally, this study makes clear that while institutional differences and the 
legacy of communism can lead to different outcomes, white-collar unions in Moscow 
have effectively used various forms of political pressure to press for concessions and 
policy changes.  
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I. Introduction 
 
When looking at the question of organized labor activity and its effectiveness in post-
communist Russia, one encounters a consensus of “quiescence.”1  This argument 
maintains that Russian unions have been coopted by the government and do not organize 
on issues contrary to government initiatives. However, this work will demonstrate that it 
is not so simple. When looking at the overall record of labor demonstrations in Moscow, 
one would be tempted to think that labor is simply coopted, yet a more nuanced portrait 
emerges once one delves deeper and analyzes white-collar labor’s effectiveness.  
 
Russian blue- and white-collar unions, which tend to deal with the state, operate using 
different processes than unions in the West that mostly operate in enterprise-union 
settings. As indicated by Sil 2, Russia’s largest trade union federation tends to operate 
using constitutional and political means such as lobbying to maintain its leading position. 
Additionally, by using the state-created Trilateral Commission on the Regulation of 
Social and Labor Relations involving enterprises, labor, and the state, blue-collar unions 
have been able to dampen the liberal economic policies the Russia government enacted 
over the past several decades, such as the new Russian labor code in 2002.3 This study 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As stated by Kubicek, “Postcommunist trade unions are indeed, in Sherlock Holmes’ 
phrase, ‘dogs that don’t bark.’ The point of course, is that by many measures they should, 
and thus labor quiescence is a mystery to be solved.” (Kubicek, Paul. J. Organized Labor 
in Postcommunist States, 3). For more insight on this, see Cook 2011 and Sil 2013. 
2 Sil, Rudra. “The Fluidity of Labor Politics in Postcommunist Transitions: Rethinking 
the Narrative of Russian Labor Quiescence”   
3 The Russian Labor Code deals with the relationship between the state, enterprises, and 
labor, outlining privileges given to each party in this trilateral framework. Additionally, it 
outlines labor management practices, giving it a great deal of sway in determining the 
flexibility (or inflexibility) or hiring and employment in Russia. 
	   5 
will indicate that in contrast to blue-collar unions, white-collar unions, which are outside 
of formal labor commissions in the Russian Federation and are comprised primarily of 
workers paid by the state budget, tend to use political means outside of formal 
constitutional structures. This often entails demonstrations, marches, and pickets, which 
is a stark contrast to the processes used by blue-collar unions. 
 
To analyze the effectiveness of these mixed methods and to yield robust comparisons to 
other post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, this study will involve a case study of 
organized labor protests in Moscow from 2000-2014, which will capture different 
impetuses for organized labor action among white- and blue-collar unions. Additionally, 
this study will facilitate a serious examination of the general context of white-collar 
union activity in the Russian Federation and will allow for a comparison of the structural 
causes which lead to differences in both mobilization of labor resources and effectiveness 
of labor demonstrations between Russia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 
Further investigation of the phenomenon of militant white-collar unions will prove useful 
as a point of comparison to the role of white-collar unions in regions with longer histories 
of capitalism, such as Western Europe and the United States of America. 
 
Russian labor is not quiescent and is shown to be quite effective at working in the present 
system. It seems to lie in an institutional middle ground between several of the countries 
considered in this study, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, due to a variety of 
factors, such as the establishment of a leading trade union and the political sensitivity of a 
hybrid regime.  
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The consequences of an active and effective labor movement are important for the 
stability of the Russian political system. As scholars have noted 4, the agreement the 
Russian government entered into with labor guaranteed support of the government and 
allowed the main union to get numerous perquisites such as retaining Soviet-era trade 
union infrastructure and facilities. Given the blue-collar unions’ adeptness in navigating 
the constitutional system and the white-collar unions’ effectiveness in mandating policy 
change via extra-constitutional methods, the government may not be able to rely on 
relative union calm indefinitely, which may lead to a reevaluation of the relationship 
between the state and organized labor. This increased labor effectiveness may lead to 
drastic changes in the ability of the state to carry out its objectives 5 and pushes us to turn 
to the comparative context for more insight on what the different outcomes of this revised 
state-labor relationship could be.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Clarke, Simon. “The State of Russian Unions”, 279 
5 The question of labor in Russia expands upon the question of the government’s base of 
power. Outside of constitutionally granted powers to the executive, the executive has 
been able to utilize swaths of the Russian population to mobilize support and implement 
government initiatives. For example, this occurred when Boris Yeltsin dissolved 
parliament, even though he did not have the constitutional power to dissolve the 
legislature, hence leading to the standoff at the White House in 1993. This decree and 
confrontation with the parliament was premised on his popular mandate to rule, which 
was affirmed by the 1993 referendum.  
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II. Russian Labor “Quiescence” 
 
At the founding of the Russian Federation, 72% of the Russian labor force belonged to 
the FNPR (Federatsiya Nezavisimykh Profsoyuzov Rossiyi)6, which was the direct 
successor to the Soviet Union’s national union, the All-Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions (VTsSPS) 7. While the number of members in the FNPR decreased drastically 
over the following two decades, from 54 million members in 1990 to 29.7 million in 
2005,8 Russian labor across sectors has continued to utilize unions. For working class 
workers there is the FNPR, along with other blue-collar unions like the KTR.  
 
Furthermore, there is also prominent union representation for the professional class in 
Russia. Indeed, as the data collected will show, unions representing workers paid by the 
state, such as teachers, healthcare workers, air dispatchers, and professors have been very 
active in demonstrating and have been effective in organizing people to join. Contrary to 
the Western norm of unions being more of a working class phenomenon, in Russia the 
professional classes are represented by their respective white-collar unions as well.  
 
However, despite the pervasive presence of unions in Russia, they seem to be 
“quiescent.” This is odd when compared to the last years of the Soviet Union, when the 
government was rocked by miner strikes in the Kuzbass and Donbass coal basins, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Clarke, Simon. “The State of Russian Unions”,.276  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 283 
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involving more than 400,000 workers 9, which contributed to the collapse of Soviet rule. 
Indeed, as Cook notes, strikes on this scale have not occurred in the Russian Federation.10 
 
In her work on the lack of action by Russian labor, Linda Cook notes four theories that 
might explain this. The first of these posits that as globalization took hold of the global 
economy, states simultaneously transitioned from communism. This global change 
weakened unions globally due to the increasing interconnectedness of labor markets, 
leading to, as she claims,  
 
1) The erosion of manufacturing industries and jobs that are most conducive to 
unionization; 2) the attendant decline in the size of enterprises; 3) growth of the 
private service sector, which is less amenable to unionization, and 4) economic 
globalization, which privileges mobile capital over labor and increases pressures 
for competition and flexibility in labor markets. 11 
 
 
 
Under this explanation, Russia’s economy and labor market were simply subject to 
market factors that affected the rest of the world at the time. 
 
Additionally, she brings up an alternative explanation – that the legacy of Soviet 
communism on enterprise caused labor to be relatively quiet in the face of policies that 
might be against its interests, leading to the image of government cooption. In Cook’s 
interpretation, because the individual enterprise was responsible for “wages, housing, 
medical care, access to consumer goods, social services, [and] recreation” 12 it created 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Cook, Linda. “Russian Labor: The Puzzle of Quiescence”, 1 
10  Ibid., 4 
11  Ibid., 5 
12  Ibid., 6 
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“multiple strands of dependence” 13 which made unions hesitant to stir confrontation with 
managers. 
 
To investigate this fear of confrontation, Ashwin explores whether unions continued the 
Soviet practice of maintaining “social peace” by collaborating with enterprises, and finds 
that modern unions in Russia do, to a large extent, view this social partnership as key and 
tend not to be active.  She indicates multiple examples of regional branches 
autonomously pursuing action because central FNPR leadership did not act in the face of 
labor violations. Indeed, even the president of the FNPR, Mikhail Shmakov, indicated in 
2000 that ‘the trade unions consider a strike to be a “failure of social partnership. Either 
social partnership or class struggle!’”14  
 
This Soviet legacy continues not only in the central leadership’s refusal to pursue conflict 
but in the length of time necessary to resolve labor disputes. As Ashwin detailed, upon 
initiating a conflict, unions had to wait 13 months for government administrators to 
resolve the issue at hand, during which wages had not been paid. 15 Given this difficult 
reality, labor is disincentivized from speaking out. While Ashwin and Cook’s cases 
involve labor working for enterprises, a similar analogy exists for state-employed 
workers, as the 1998 protests in Russia were mostly led by government-employed 
workers who were asking for their wages to be paid. 16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Ibid. 
14 Ashwin, Sarah. “Social Partnership or a ‘Complete Sellout’? Russian Trade Unions’ 
Responses to Conflict”, 35  
15 Ibid., 36 
16 Sil, Rudra. “The Fluidity of Labor Politics in Postcommunist Transitions”  
	   10 
 
While the Soviet legacy may have continued in the system of labor dispute arbitration 
and state-enterprise-labor dynamics, the relationship between the state and labor became 
much more combative, as labor attempted to assert autonomy. In her exploration of a 
third potential cause of labor quiescence in Russia, Cook indicates that labor may have 
kept quiet due to the state’s renewed vigor in suppressing labor concerns. As Yeltsin 
proceeded to guide Russia through shock therapy, unions were afraid that they were 
going to be harmed and did not support Yeltsin, going as far as supporting the parliament 
that attempted to impeach him in 1993.  
 
Indeed, as Simon Clarke notes, after choosing to support parliament in Yeltsin’s 
confrontation with the Duma (Russia’s lower house of parliament), the FNPR faced 
harassment by the government, as the administration “froze the FNPR’s bank accounts 
and cut off the telephones, banned the check-off of union dues, took away the unions’ 
responsibility for social insurance and health and safety, and threatened to confiscate 
their property.” 17  After this, the FNPR changed leadership and was much more 
conservative in its approach to government, never attempting the same kind of dissent as 
in 1993.  
 
Additionally, the power dynamics in Russia’s federal structure may help explain labor 
inactivity. Robertson notes that labor may be quiet or noisy based on the intentions of the 
ruling elite. As seen in his analysis, the relationship between regional governors and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Clarke, Simon. “The State of the Russian Unions”, 279  
	   11 
Moscow ruling elite in Russia was significant in determining how many days were lost to 
strikes. Furthermore, the poorer or weaker a region also determined how often the 
governor would lend support to “noisy” strategies such as labor demonstrations. 18  For 
example, Robertson notes that during the 1997 submarine worker strike, the governor of 
the Primorski Krai region, who had bad relations with Moscow, provided buses and 
police protection for the workers. 19 Hence, while central government- labor dynamics 
play a role in explaining labor action, the relations between the regions and the center 
may be as important to consider.  
 
These interwoven dynamics lend credence to Cook’s fourth possible explanation for 
labor quiescence, that labor simply didn’t know to whom to address their grievances20. 
Due to the interplay of private business and government in the 90s and the chaos that 
followed due to the failed privatization, it was difficult to determine who was responsible 
for the unrest. Hence, without a target, protesting was in vain.  
 
Labor seems to have mechanisms to effect change despite these difficulties. As Sil makes 
clear, the unions played a considerable role in helping temper some of the language in the 
2002 Labor Code. 21 Whereas the original version was going to be much more pro-
management and introduce more employee flexibility, the FNPR managed to convince 
the Duma to give workers more legal protections and force employers to negotiate with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Robertson, Graeme B. “Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes.", 795 
19 Ibid., 787 
20 Cook, Linda. “Russian Labor: The Puzzle of Quiescence”, 8 
21 Sil, Rudra. “The Fluidity of Labor Politics in Postcommunist Transitions” 
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unions. 22 
 
Despite this, Cook claims that the level of labor protests in recent years has remained 
low. One would expect this during Putin’s first two terms as wages grew and the 
economy expanded, satisfying labor. However, recent findings indicate that even during 
the recent financial crisis, during which Russian GDP fell 7.9% 23, labor was still 
relatively calm.  
 
Gimpelson posits that labor was calm due to its flexibility in adverse circumstances. He 
notes that in the 90s, when the economic situation was dire, workers took furlough days 
and wage cuts, while overall unemployment was low.24 Hence, wages and working 
regularity were not sticky, but employment was. He also discusses the recent crisis, 
indicating that employers engaged in the same techniques, leaving layoffs as a last resort 
and preferring to reduce labor costs in other ways 25. He attributes this flexibility to the 
costly and conflict-prone nature of layoffs, as enterprises can suffer protests if there are 
lay-offs and government intervention in labor markets makes layoffs an unattractive 
choice 26.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid., 203 
23 Gimpelson, Vladimir; Kapeliushnikov, Rostislav “2011 “Labor Market Adjustment: Is 
Russia Different?”, 10 
24 Ibid., 6-7 
25 Ibid., 10-12 
26 Ibid., 21 
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III. Is Russian Labor Uniquely “Quiescent?” 
 
Considerable work has been conducted on post-communist labor activity and 
effectiveness in Central and Eastern Europe. 27 By looking at the variations in the 
development of unions in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary one can see if 
Russian labor is unique or if this decreased labor activity and ability to affect government 
policy are par for the course in post-communist Eastern and Central Europe. All of these 
nations were members of the Warsaw Pact, heavily industrialized, and as comparative 
cases, are useful in showing how different institutional and political choices can yield 
considerably different outcomes, even given similar contexts 28.  
 
Just like in the Soviet Union, trade unions in these countries were treated as 
“transmission belts” 29 in providing benefits and managing industrial relations, being 
equipped with infrastructure and facilities such as spas and employee housing to 
incentivize workers and promote productivity. However, as these states began to 
transition from communism, they did not necessarily follow the Russian path of having a 
central labor union immediately upon liberalization. 
 
One of the clearest examples of this is Poland, where the dissident trade union, Solidarity, 
gained power initially. Solidarity was formed as an alternative trade union to the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Sil 2014, Kubicek 2004, Kubik 2002, Avdagic 2005 
28 Sil, Rudra “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation in Postcommunist Europe: A Paired 
Comparison of Poland and the Czech Republic” 
29 Ibid, 8 
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presented by the communist Polish state 30 and presented a successful political challenge 
to the party apparatus, helping overthrow the party and usher in a new era for Poland. 
Upon seizing power, Solidarity proceeded on a path of pro-market reforms, contrary to 
what the alternative union, the OPZZ, preferred. Unlike the Russian FNPR, Solidarity 
operated in a divided context, with its supporters being more pro-right and reform-
minded than the leftist OPZZ members who were discontent with the drastic reforms 
which led to severe inter-union tensions and conflict.31  
 
Hungary has an even more divided labor environment, which has been described as 
having as tranquil a system of labor relations as the Vatican due to the multiplicity of 
unions.32 Unlike Poland, whose main unions are Solidarity and the OPZZ, Hungary has a 
plethora of labor unions rather than an all-encompassing federation. This competition 
between the unions pushes them to be shut out of policy-making because of their inability 
to have a united voice.  Hence, while Hungarian trade unions are considerably less 
influenced by the state, they are less powerful. 33 
 
This is a stark contrast to the Czech labor situation in which ČMKOS is the most 
important union in the country. Out of the three nations, it is the closest parallel to the 
FNPR, as it also descended from its communist predecessor and is the largest union force 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Kubicek. “Organized Labor in Postcommunist States”, 26 
31 Sil “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation”, 20 
32 Kubicek, “Organized Labor in Postcommunist States”, 136 
33 Ibid., 157 
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in the country. 34 This “unified, encompassing union confederation” 35 has been able to 
exert significant economic and labor policy influence, pushing the government to 
constrain employer flexibility in favor of a low unemployment, low wage model. 36 
 
Even though there are significant institutional differences, these states reacted similarly 
upon liberalization by switching the dispersion of social benefits from being the unions’ 
responsibility to the state’s 37, leading to a decline in union membership. Similar to the 
FNPR’s record over the last several decades, unions in these countries experienced a fall 
from 90% union membership density before the fall of communism 38 to the mid-teens by 
2009 39. 
 
Despite these obstacles, unions have persevered in effecting change. Given the 
differences in institutional arrangements, labor’s ability to form pro-worker policy is best 
understood as a spectrum in these three countries. The degree of cooption by the 
government differs greatly between these three countries, as demonstrated by the ability 
of trade unions to press for changes in government policy that are pro- labor more 
successfully in countries like the Czech Republic and less successfully in Poland. This 
context serves as an important guidepost to see how effective labor is in Russia, as Russia 
had to go through similar circumstances, and at times even utilized similar institutions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Avdagic, Sabina. “State-labour relations in East Central Europe: explaining variations 
in union effectiveness”, 38 
35 Ibid., 43 
36 Sil “ Liberalization and Labor Incorporation”, 3 
37 Ibid., 9 
38 Avdagic 27 
39 Sil “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation” 9 
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These three nations, like Russia, relied on the trilateral framework of enterprise, 
government, and labor, but had mixed results. Avdagic indicates that government-union 
interactions are the cause of varying union effectiveness. Given the plethora of state-
owned enterprise and the minority-share of private enterprises in the larger economy until 
the 2000s in these countries40, this power dynamic is the root of the ability of labor 
unions to effectively create policy.  In effect, policy changes are caused by disparities in 
power between the state and organized labor. Hence, arrangements that lead to greater 
union power relative to the state will lead to better consequences for workers. 
Specifically, her model stresses union cohesiveness and relative independence from party 
politics as the variables which best predict union effectiveness and this framework leads 
to a fascinating examination of the relative labor quiescence in these three countries. 
 
For example, in the Czech Republic, union unity pushed the government to recognize the 
union as a credible negotiating partner and led to pro-worker economic policy.41 This was 
quite different from the Polish case in which a bifurcated union structure split labor 
between OPZZ and Solidarity, which when combined with political cooption led to 
workers being sidelined 42. In contrast to these two cases, Hungary lies in the middle, as it 
has a fragmented union structure with “partial links with political parties” 43, which led to 
some successes and some failures in enacting pro-labor policy. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Avdagic 41 
41 Sil “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation” 18 
42 Avdagic 44 
43 Ibid., 43 
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While this dynamic framework is useful in gauging labor efficacy, Sil’s modification of 
this model, taking into account unions lobbying parties to support pro-labor causes, has 
significant ramifications for the Russian context. ČMKOS was able to exploit parties’ 
interests rather than use political platforms to further their agenda by supporting both the 
communist party (the KSČM) and the left-of-center Czech Social Democratic Party. 
While these two political parties would not pursue a coalition44, they would vote together 
on issues relevant to Czech labor which led to the relatively more pro-labor climate in the 
Czech Republic compared to Poland. This is a stark contrast to the Polish situation where 
the initial leading union, Solidarity, took a stern right-of-center approach, promoting 
increasing employer flexibility.  
 
This comparative context has important parallels with Russia. ČMKOS was successful in 
leading to more pro-labor legislation by lobbying other parties and relying on political 
processes, rather than taking to the streets or leading organized action. This is quite 
analogous to the aforementioned FNPR activities in response to the 2002 Labor Code. 
While avoiding the “failure” of striking on a massive scale, the FNPR was able to effect 
change and dilute the more liberal reforms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Sil “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation”, 24 
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IV. Patterns in Labor Protests in Moscow 
 
Further investigation was necessary to see whether labor really was quiescent, and this 
led to this chronological study of labor demonstrations in Moscow from 2001 to 2014. 
Moscow is the political, financial, and media capital of Russia, which, using Robertson’s 
term, makes it the ideal venue for “noisy” tactics which bring attention to a cause. In the 
initial case design, the time was limited to Moscow under Putin as the leader (be it 
President or Prime Minister) due to his focus on economic growth and his continuation of 
Yeltsin’s labor policies. This was important as it would help indicate whether labor 
demonstrations were less prevalent in times of high growth, indicating that government 
cooption was less the cause of quiescence, and that economic and wage growth were the 
actual causes of a peaceful “social partnership.” 
 
Additionally, in the initial design of the study I turned to one of Russia’s leading business 
journals, the Kommersant, as it had been under multiple owners and tended to be 
considered an independent newspaper for most of its existence. The Kommersant has 
digitized all of its articles, making it a useful resource for researching instances of labor 
demonstrations in Moscow over the past 14 years. I used terms that were as broad as 
possible to make sure that I did not miss any demonstrations. Hence, I used the terms 
profsoyuz (trade union) and miting (demonstration). 
 
Even in the initial design of the study, it was clear that given resource constraints, it 
would be difficult to obtain an exact estimate, as the only organization that would 
necessarily have an exact count of demonstrations would probably be the Ministry of 
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Internal Affairs or the Moscow local police, as they would provide protection for these 
events. As obtaining this record was not feasible given time and resource constraints, 
using a newspaper which had a record of impartiality proved effective. 
  
Furthermore, to track how the protestors’ demand related to the state and government 
policy, the data were grouped as either pro-government or anti-government. Pro-
government protests were protests in which the unions demonstrated with the United 
Russia party or in support of government initiatives (indicating a degree of cooption or 
manipulation of organized labor for political purposes), whereas the anti-government 
label indicated events in which the unions protested against a government decision or 
with parties that were opposed to United Russia.  
 
The initial analysis yielded 44 instances of union demonstrations over a 14 year period. 
Out of those, 20 were pro-government, while the rest were nominally anti-government. 
 
The pro-government demonstrations include yearly instances of May 1st demonstrations, 
in which the unions and government always participated in together. With the exception 
of 2001 when the Communist Party took a more prominent role than United Russia, all of 
the May 1st demonstrations were grouped as pro-government. The other instances of pro-
government demonstrations are much more revealing. 
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The first non-May 1st demonstration occurred in 2002, following the passage of the new 
Labor Code. The FNPR and the non-industrial unions both demonstrated to pressure 
employers to raise wages, hence to implement the new labor code. This may be viewed as 
a way for the union to provide political cover for the government, as the final legislation 
that was passed was not as pro-business as enterprises would have liked. This was the 
first pro-government action that was directly linked to supporting the presidential 
administration and existing government policy in this period. 
 
In 2004, the Moscow unions demonstrated in support of government policy and against 
terrorism following the Beslan school crisis. This followed several years of tougher 
policy towards the Russian Caucasus, and set a precedent for labor protesting in support 
of government military policy, as was seen by protests later in the decade.  
 
In 2008, following the conflict between Russia and Georgia, the FNPR demonstrated for 
higher wages and against Georgia. Given the description of the events of that day, 
including the multitudes that wore the colors of the Russian flag, it seems that this 
demonstration was more of a way to show support than to make concrete demands. This 
is heightened by the fact that the simultaneous demonstrations in other cities made 
concrete demands such as changes to tax policy, whereas the demonstrations in the two 
largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, seemed to center on “solidarity with the South 
Ossetian nation.”45 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 ““Profsoyuzi porabotali na dostoinuiu zarplatu” [The trade unions are working for a 
decent  wage]  Kommersant 2008. 
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The remaining pro-government demonstrations were timed around the 2012 elections and 
following the 2011 demonstrations in Moscow. The December 2011 protest and February 
2012 protests were explicitly aimed at supporting Vladimir Putin’s bid for reelection, 
lending credence to the theory that labor was dependent on the ruling elite’s will and did 
what was necessary to support those in power. 
 
This same nuance arises when analyzing the prevalence of anti-government 
demonstrations in Moscow. While the number of demonstrations against policies would 
understandably be more numerous than demonstrations in support of an initiative, not all 
of the observations are valid for this analysis. For example, while many demonstrations 
argued against specific government policies, they overlap with government policies that 
the presidential administration tried to implement or was moving towards. This indicated 
that the demonstrations were actually pro-government and were an effort to shore up 
support for up government policies. For example, the 2005 protest by the agricultural 
union protested against inadequate support for Russian agriculture, an effort that had 
been restarted under Vladimir Putin and was one of his major domestic policy goals. 46  
 
This is indicative of the fact that many of the anti-government protests do not seem to be 
serious, as seen in the 2001 FNPR protest demanding that deputies fly more 47 or the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Wegren, Stephen. “Agriculture” Return to Putin’s Russia. Fifth Edition 2013 
47 ““Aviastroitel’naia katastrofa: Profsoyuzy trebuiut ot pravitel’stva zakazov” 
[Catastrophe in Aircraft Construction: Trade Unions demand more orders from the 
government] Kommersant. 23 February 2001. 
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2008 FNPR protest which protested against Georgia and for higher wages 48. When 
controlling for many of these less serious actions, a fascinating observation rises to the 
surface –white-collar workers and their respective unions lead the majority of anti-
government street protests. Often these are unions of workers paid by the state, such as 
the teachers, secretaries, air dispatchers, and scientists’ unions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 “Profsoyuzi porabotali na dostoinuiu zarplatu” [The trade unions are working for a 
decent  wage]  Kommersant 2008. 
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V. The Dogs That Did Bark  
 
All workers, including white-collar workers, were unionized in the Soviet Union. Hence, 
upon the creation of the Russian Federation, these workers were already subsumed in 
FNPR structures. While the majority of the unions that comprise the FNPR are blue-
collar, the white collar unions, such as the Union of Teachers, Union of Non-Industrial 
Workers, the Air Dispatchers Union, and the various healthcare worker unions that 
played a prominent role in the first round of the study, are components of the FNPR’s 
array of unions.  Additionally, unlike many of the industrial workers who work for 
private enterprises, these white-collar workers are biudzhetniki, or paid out of the state 
budget (biudzhet).  
 
To further investigate their activity, the study was conducted again but with more 
sources, including Lenta.ru and Radio Svoboda, which are known for their relative 
impartiality. Like Kommersant, they had digitized all of their articles which was used as 
data for the period in question. Once again, using the same search terms as in the first 
study and focusing on activity in Moscow, the sources used yielded 24 instances of 
protest.  
 
While there had been consideration of including St. Petersburg or other large Russian 
cities in the sample, the results from the search indicated that almost all of the labor 
activity in cities outside of Moscow was blue-collar labor activity. Searching for white-
collar union protests in St. Petersburg only yielded 3 additional white-collar protests and 
2 which had occurred at the same time as the ones happening in Moscow and for the 
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same cause. As this wouldn’t have made the findings considerably more robust, the study 
remained focused on Moscow. 
 
The 24 results indicate a distribution clustered around 2001 – 2005 and 2010 -2014, with 
no significant white-collar union activity between 2006 and 2009. The two clusters of 
activity represent, for the most part, two different kinds of demands on the part of the 
protestors. From the demands listed, it appears that a desire for more funding fueled most 
of the demonstrations in the first half of the 2000s and a call for reform or changes to 
reform drove people to the streets in the early 2010s. 
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The first cluster begins with the teachers’ union calling for pay raises and more funding 
in 2001, a request they would make again in 2003 and twice in 2005.  Additionally, the 
academics’ union at the Russian Academy of Sciences would make a demand for more 
funding four times over the course of this first cluster. Overall, out of the 10 events in this 
first cluster, all but 3 of the demonstrations called for more funding, suggesting a pattern.  
 
This trend may suggest a disconnect between rising expectations and government 
expenditures. The 2000s were a period of significant Russian economic growth, and the 
acceleration of calls for increased government spending and wage raises may indicate 
that the unions realized this and were aware of the positive budgetary implications. These 
demonstrations seem to have been successful. The 2003 Russian budget planned for 
Pro-Government 
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414.1 billion rubles in spending on education49 whereas the budget two years later nearly 
doubled that amount to 801.8 billion rubles.50 The Federal Service of National Statistics 
indicates that education spending grew at roughly the same rate as the budget, however 
the composition of the budget being tilted towards primary education is what may have 
led to the relative calm from the teachers’ unions following the first concentration of 
labor protests.  
 
Additionally, the five year interlude between protests by the academics at the Russian 
Academy of Sciences indicates that perhaps the composition of the budget may have only 
been skewed in their favor closer to the beginning of the second concentration of labor 
protests as demonstrations began again in 2010. This is logical as funds were diverted 
from education funding to other components of the state budget as oil prices declined and 
international financial markets suffered tremendous stress. Indeed as noted as late as 
2013, the Russian government has for several years decreased healthcare and education 
spending and increased outlays on social obligations and military spending. 51 
 
The other reason for protest—the call for reform in the first cluster of labor activity 
foreshadows the second cluster. However, in their pro-reform efforts, labor appears to be 
less successful in the first time period. The unified social tax in 2003, monetization 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 2003 was the earliest year for which the Russian Statistical Service’s annual 
publication, “Russia by the Numbers” had data. Information on the state’s budget for the 
year is in the “Finances” chapter of the guide (Chapter 21). 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalo
g/doc_1135075100641 
50 Consolidated Budget of the Russian Federation for the years 2005-2009 
51 Novy biudzhet Rossii: bole voenny, menee sotsial’ny [Russia’s New Budget: more 
military, fewer social expenditures]. BBC Russian Service.  25 October 2013. 
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reforms in 2005, and Andrei Fursenko’s place as Minister of Education were firmly in 
place despite protests. In fact, as the Kommersant notes, in response to the newspaper’s 
questions about the protests, Minister Fursenko replied, “Let them protest, I’ll still be on 
my trip abroad.”52  
 
In the second period though, only four of the demonstrations call for more funding, two 
of which are held by the academics’ union. Almost all of the other events focus on 
rallying against proposed reforms, beginning with reforms which would have changed the 
state’s role in the pension system. This was followed by protests by the academics against 
the reorganization of the Russian Academy of Sciences which would have made it more 
fiscally responsible, and most recently Moscow was shaken by healthcare workers taking 
to the streets rallying against healthcare reforms which included cuts in government 
healthcare spending. The thread tying all of these proposed reforms is a move towards 
fiscal austerity and spending efficiency.  While the Russian economy had recovered 
somewhat following the 2008 crisis, the curtailment in these spending items may be an 
attempt to sustain the sovereign wealth fund in case of further crisis or as a move to 
allocate funds to other budget items.  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 “Nauka ne uchitsya” [Science doesn’t learn] Kommersant. 25 May 2005 
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VI. What Drove the Unions to the Streets? 
 
While the recent reforms affecting biudzhetniki that the Russian government proposed 
were quite drastic, the state pushed through similar measures in regards to other segments 
of the labor market without facing such backlash, indicating that white collar unions’ 
response was quite extraordinary. For example, the Labor Code of 2002 forced a certain 
element of employee flexibility unto the Russian labor market. Additionally, when in 
2011, billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov proposed 53 a radical rethinking of the Labor Code 
during his time as Chairman of the Labor Market committee at the Union of 
Entrepreneurs, no massive protests occurred. When similar labor proposals were 
proposed even outside of official Duma hearings, the FNPR took to the streets, as was 
seen in the early 2000s when the FNPR protested the new labor code. 
 
In spite of these liberalizing measures, Russian labor has experienced massive wage 
increases with wage increases from 2005 – 2013 keeping a compound annual growth rate 
in the low- to high-teens, depending on the occupation. 54  For industrial and blue-collar 
workers, this meant moving from poverty into a comfortable working-class level. Given 
Russia’s expanding social safety net, fixed capital investments, and infrastructure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Prokhorov proposed changes to align the Russian system with more liberal standards, 
to orient the economy towards a focus on services, stating, “Our labor legislation follows 
the Soviet-era labor code, which was developed and approved about 40 years ago. 
Whether it is good or bad, this legislation no longer performs its functions. Obviously, 
regulations that were created to protect the values of an industrial society impede the 
development of a post-industrial society.” (Kononova, Svetlana.  “Labored Regulation” 
Russia Profile. 04.12.2011)  
54  “Srednyaya nachislyunnaya zarabotnaya plata rabotnikov organizatsii po gruppam 
zanyatii” [Average employee salary based on occupational category] 06.11.2014.  Federal 
Statistical Services 
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investments, this bulk of labor has been able to become wealthier throughout the period 
studied in this case.  
 
In this same period, the data indicate that white-collar workers also became wealthier, 
including the biudzhetniki, such as healthcare workers and professors, whose incomes 
often grew at the same rates as those in other occupations. For example, between 2005 
and 2013, healthcare workers’ (except nurses) monthly salaries grew at a CAGR of 19% 
from 8,664 rubles to 35,975 rubles. Similarly, textile workers’ salaries grew at a CAGR 
of 17% from 6,262 rubles to 21, 678 rubles.   
 
Given the fact that salaries rapidly grew for all of the constituent parts of Russian labor, 
what explains the difference in demonstration frequency? The discussion on overall labor 
activity in Moscow made clear that for the most part, the FNPR did not participate in the 
same kind of massive or directed activities against government initiatives, whereas white-
collar unions did. Given this disparity, it may not be co-option by the government or 
overall wage increases that are the explanatory variable behind labor activity, but rather 
expectations.  
 
Indeed, when looking at the biudzhetniki’s activity, one encounters several contradictions 
needing further examination. First, recent data indicate that 37% of Russia’s population 
identifies as middle-class, entailing a salary range from 25,000 – 45,000 rubles per 
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month. 55 However, when looking at Ibragimov’s work on Russian savings56, only 22.3% 
of the biudzhetniki consider themselves middle-class, indicating a deviation from the 
population average.  
 
Additionally, when turning to the Federal Statistical Service’s data on those professions 
that have protested recently, one sees that their salaries are quite high and would place 
them solidly in the self-reported middle class. For example, university instructors 57 earn 
approximately 30,000 rubles per month, which is consistent with the mean income of 
33,000 rubles of those in the highly educated occupational category 58. 
 
This disparity between the reported data and labor activity support two possible 
hypotheses which could support why unions demonstrated over this time period: 
mismatched wage expectations and mismatched employment expectations due 
uncertainties in government policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 “Sredni klass v Rossii ne rastyet” [The Russian middle class is not growing] 
Kommersant. 16 May 2014 
56  Ibragimova, Dilyara Hanifovna. “Sberech’ nel’zya potratit’: gde rossiiskie srednie 
klassy  stavili i postavyat zapyatuiu?” [Saving can’t be spent: where are the Russian 
middle classes placing the comma?] X Mezhdunarodnaya nauchnaya konferentsiya po 
problemam razvitiya ekonomiki I obschestva [X International Scientific Conference 
regarding Problems in Economic and Societal Development]  
57 Classified in the Federal Statistical Service’s data as “Prepodovateli kolledzhei, 
universitetov i drugikh vuzov”  [Instructors in colleges and other universities] 
58 Classified in the Federal Statistical Service’s data as “Spetsialisty vyshego urovnya 
kvalifikatsii” [Specialists of the highest level of classification] 
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An Expectations Trap? 
 
 
In 1992, a third of Russia’s working population was earning below the official living 
wage, leading to widespread poverty plaguing the country in the 1990s. 59 By 2013, this 
figure had been reduced to approximately 11%, representing a dramatic shift. As 
mentioned, the late-1990s were filled with labor protests across the country as workers 
demanded higher pay and for the government to pay wage arrears. As the level of poverty 
decreased and people’s living standards increased, the overall frequency of labor activity 
decreased as well. Indeed, the intensity of the labor protests detailed in the findings above 
pale in comparison to the dramatic actions taken in 1998 when miners froze Russia’s rail 
network and barricaded legislators’ offices60.  
 
White-collar protests did not slow as dramatically as blue-collar union protests. While the 
Union of the Russian Academy of Sciences was quite active in the late-1990s and early-
2000s, it continued its mobilizations of scientists throughout the period studied.  If the 
variable causing this were just income, then there is a clear disparity as the scientists 
already earn relatively high wages. Looking at the mean earnings of those in the field of 
higher education, one sees that their incomes range in the upper half of the middle class 
range (25,000 – 45,000) of the overall population, with physicists and chemists earning 
the most at 46,000 rubles. This indicates that simply earning more does not placate these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 “Chislennost’ naseleniya c denezhnymi dokhodami nizhe velichiny prozhitochnogo 
minimuma i defitsit denezhnogo dokhoda” [Number of people with incomes below 
subsistence level and the respective deficit] 01.21.2015 Federal Statistical  Services   
60 “Protests Spur Lawmakers to Shell Out for Russia Miners” 16 May 1998 Los Angeles 
Times. http://articles.latimes.com/1998/may/16/news/mn-50353  
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strata of society. 61  
 
This has peculiar consequences for the Russian developmental state. As noted by Sutela, 
under Vladimir Putin, “Russia used its financial resources for supporting what were 
regarded as strategic industries and companies…[and] chose defending incumbent jobs 
over economic destruction.”62 This investment-heavy model was capable of leading to a 
given level of wealth creation, consistent with the Solow growth model 63.  Whereas 
those that were in depths of poverty are now able to afford a working-class lifestyle, the 
middle-class is having a hard time even recognizing itself as actually middle class 
because it relies on an external framework. These Moscow elite who comprise the 
biudzhetniki 64 are well-educated and connected, 65 meaning that their preferred salary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 “Srednyaya nachislyunnaya zarabotnaya plata rabotnikov organizatsii po gruppam 
zanyatii” [Average employee salary based on occupational category] 06.11.2014.  Federal 
Statistical Services 
62 Sutela, Pekka.. Ed: Wegren, Stephen K; “Economic Policy.” Return to Putin’s 
Russia,185 
63  Stagnation may imply that Russia has reached steady-state long term growth given the 
existing institutional context, capital depth, and investment.. In order to reach a higher 
steady state equilibrium, the capital-labor ratio must be modified to allow for greater 
factor productivity. To do so would require liberalizing measures such as facilitating 
investment and improved practices which would lead to greater productivity. For more 
elaboration, see Solow, Robert. “ A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65 – 94.  
64 As described by the Echo of Moscow – “Odnako printsipial’noe otlichie ot zapadnykh 
stran zakliuchaetsya v tom, shto rossiiskii srednii klass – v bol’shinstve svoyem— 
rabotniki gossektora, a ne chastnykh kompanii.”  [“It seems that the main difference from 
Western countries is that the Russian middle class is mostly comprised of government 
workers, not workers in the private sector.”] (“Srednii klass – prikormlennaya 
loyal’nost’” [The middle class – bought off loyalty] Echo of Moscow. 08 July 2014.) 
65 Given an approximation by the Russian Academy of Sciences (see “Sredni klass v 
sovremennoi Rossii: 10 let spustya” [The middle class in contemporary Russia: 10 years 
later] 2014. Institut sotsiologii rossiskoi akademii nauk [The Institute of Sociology at the 
Russian Academy of Sciences] , it is fair to assume that the biudzhetniki are as well-
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level may be attuned more to the income earned in more developed capitalist contexts, 
which would be unattainable given the present level of development in Russia. 
 
Given these two frames of reference, one of an impoverished past and the other of what 
could be, there seem to be two “Russias,” one of which sets its frame of reference to the 
past, remembering how bad things were. This is the new working-class, lifted up on a 
wave of investment and government transfers. The second “Russia” however, the middle-
class, may be using an international frame of reference, leading to a disconnect. 
 
This hypothesis is supported by the differing frequency of protests and labor actions in 
Moscow and indicates that those with the frame of reference in the 1990s are less active 
now and tend to be the “quiescent” labor pool often noted in analyses of Russian unions. 
This group seems to be supportive of the state due to the government’s success in its 
main promise of economic growth—delivering the masses from poverty.  
 
However, those with a forward-looking frame of reference are those in the white-collar 
unions, as they are well educated and tend to be politically active.  If this group increases 
in size, the current developmental framework would be difficult to maintain. However to 
cause a widening of this group, the Solow model would call for endogenous 
developments such as productivity growth which would be difficult due to the Russian 
state’s focus on physical capital widening rather than intellectual capital over the past two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
connected as the other portions of the middle class, which are described in the report as 
very connected to the internet. 
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decades.66  Hence, the risk of their mobilization posing a political threat is somewhat 
minimized. 
 
Breaking the Low Salary – High Employment Pledge 
 
While income expectations can propel the masses to the streets, a rapidly changing labor 
market may be another key factor. The Russian labor market has been historically 
flexible in that it often traded lower wages and fewer working hours to prevent layoffs.67 
For the majority of the labor force (and for the FNPR’s main industrial and blue-collar 
components), this arrangement still holds. However for the white-collar biudzhetniki, it 
seems that this has begun to come undone.  
 
The recent healthcare workers protests centered on the Moscow city government’s 
proposal to close hospitals and lay off doctors, 68 foreshadowing a bill in the Duma which 
would mimic this proposal on a national level.  While it still remains to be seen if this 
will happen, the fact that the government is considering trimming the size of its employee 
base seems to violate the norms of the Russian labor market. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66  This is consistent with the state’s main budget line items of infrastructure and defense 
growing much more rapidly than education. 
67 Gimpelson, Vladimir; “Labor Market Adjustment: Is Russia Different?”, 
68 “Vrachi vzyalis’ za lechenie sistemy zdravookhraneniya” [The doctors have taken on 
treating the healthcare system] Kommersant. 02 November  2014. 
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As Ovchareva notes 69, the government has done the opposite of what employers usually 
did in Russia. Rather than cut hours and keep employment stable in times of economic 
hardship, the government has now increased salaries and is cutting the number of workers 
it employs. However, in an effort to stem overall economic stagnation, the government’s 
pay raises for the biudzhetniki cannot be squared with other mandatory expenses such as 
social benefits and infrastructure investments.  
 
This second hypothesis may become more applicable as the Russian government needs to 
make difficult fiscal choices. If it chooses to maintain wage growth while keeping 
physical capital investment constant, then it will need to spread the layoffs to other 
workers, which may be a rallying cry for the other white-collar unions. 70  
 
The Unions’ Effectiveness in Stymieing Reform 
 
Despite this move towards austerity in some areas of the budget, there seem to have been 
some concessions to unions. For example, when the government attempted to reform the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, the union created a wider support base and was able to 
extract major concessions. The scientists’ union collaborated with the Communist Party 
to get a petition against the reforms signed by 120,000 people and further protested in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 “Bol’she drugikh stagnatsiiu v Rossii oschutyat biudzhetniki. Zarplaty im pvyshat’ ne 
iz chego, pridyetsya uvol’nyat’” [State workers will be more sensitive to stagnation in 
Russia. There will need to be layoffs] TV Rain. 07 July 2014. 
70 This fear may be one of the reasons that protests often involve multiple white-collar 
unions rather than just the directly affected union. 
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Moscow several times in 2013. 71 A year later, the reforms were considerably watered 
down, as the institutional changes that would increase fiscal austerity were directed by 
scientists from the Academy, rather than outsiders. To accomplish this, the academics’ 
union combined the institutional and party-based method the FNPR used in 2002 to 
amend the labor code with white-collar unions’ usual street-based strategy to soften the 
blow of any reforms. This hybrid strategy seems to be particularly effective, and may be 
a key factor in extracting concessions from the government.  
 
The healthcare workers’ union employed similar tactics in late 2014 in response to the 
proposed medical system reforms. In early- and late-November, the union of medical 
workers, along with other professional unions held demonstrations protesting the 
proposed reforms 72 which would have cut the number of doctors in the country and 
decreased overall healthcare spending. While additional protests are planned for 2015, it 
will be interesting to see if they choose to use the same political mechanisms as the 
academics’ union and the FNPR before them.  
 
Overall, protesting on the streets to effect serious policy change or reform is a relatively 
new occurrence that may be based on the concessions made during the 2005 protests 
against the monetization of benefits which would have replaced social benefits such as 
transportation and free meals into a state stipend. As Evans notes, the 2005 protests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 “V tsentre Moskvy proshel miting protiv reform” [A protest against RAN reform took 
place in the center of Moscow” Lenta.ru 28 September 2013   
72 “Aktsiya protesta medikov nachalas’ v Moskve” [The healthcare workers’ protest 
began  in Moscow] Kommersant, 30 November 2014 
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caught the political parties by surprise 73 and eventually led to the government making 
several concessions to the proposed plan after the protests carried on for two months. 74 
Additionally, following the 2011 protests involving hundreds of thousands protesting 
across the country, the government instituted major reforms intended to increase voter 
confidence 75. As Evans suggests, these gradual concessions may be leading to a “pattern 
of learned behavior”76 which successive demonstrations utilize to extract further 
concessions.  
 
This group learning represents an evolution in organized labor tactics, particularly by the 
white-collar unions. While the FNPR tends to stick to formal mechanisms such as the 
trilateral framework, the white-collar unions are savvy at applying hybrid political 
pressure in a hybrid regime, in that they take to the streets while using formal 
constitutional mechanisms to press for concessions. While any legislation and reform 
proposed by the government will likely be in the same general framework as the original 
version (the 2005 monetization reforms and the 2013 Russian Academy of Sciences 
reforms were similar to the original proposals), the concessions have significant value. As 
seen in the 2013 reforms, the concessions cushioned most of the blow and left the 
reorganization process in the hands of academics rather than external supervisors 77 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Evans, Alfred B.. Ed: Wegren, Stephen K; “Civil Society and Protest.” Return to 
Putin’s Russia, 109 
74 Ibid., 110 
75 Monaghan, A.C “The End of the Putin Era” 12-13 
76 Evans “Civil Society and Protest” 118 
77 RAN was able to get a moratorium on reforms and based on the remarks of the 
President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, it appears that the reforms will lower the 
burden for the academics in the academy. (“Ne ostavit’ RAN” [Don’t leave the RAN 
Behind]. Rossiiskaya Gazeta. 04 December  2014.) 
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which represents a major concession. The results of this study indicate the potential for 
this disconnect between formal and informal implementation of reforms, based on 
concessions, will continue if the process of learned political behavior continues as well.   
 
Changes in State-Union Relations and the Impact on State Power 
 
This brings us back to the larger question – what impact does this have on the state 
power? Upon the arrival of Putin, the government created a growth pact, limiting political 
participation, including labor involvement, in policy decisions in return for promising 
economic growth and stability. The hypotheses presented and the recent efficacy of labor 
in affecting government policy indicate that this “deal” may no longer hold. 
 
The first hypothesis explored the notion that differing expectations between working-
class and white-collar unions led to different levels of activism. As mentioned, it appears 
that the general growth pact holds for the working class because their economic frame of 
reference was shaped by prior hardships and the foundation of their wealth can still be 
targeted given the current investment- and capital-heavy system of economic 
development. However, the state will not be able to keep its pact with the white-collar 
unions who are increasingly growing disenchanted with the tradeoffs presented. As such, 
the state will not be able maintain the current institutional structure while appeasing the 
richer biudzhetniki unless it undertakes comprehensive economic reforms focusing on 
human capital and endogenous growth factors.  
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Undertaking this kind of development is difficult, as it would require trade-offs between 
investments that carry short- to medium-term payoffs (such as capital and infrastructure 
investments) and longer-term payoffs that would appease the middle class (such as 
investments in education). 78 
 
This trade-off is akin to the wage-employment trade-off that was usually the norm in the 
Russian market. Given decreasing economic prospects under the current model, along 
with the current economic stagnation, the Russian government needs to make difficult 
choices. Indeed, the proposal under review that would results in thousands of layoffs 
would be a drastic revision of the prior understanding between labor and employers 
(public and private), indicating that the state is pursuing other priorities. Whether it tries 
to prevent stagnation by increasing white-collar workers salaries or refocuses the 
economy to allow for endogenous growth factors to be more prominent, sacrifices will 
need to be made.  
 
While accomplishing these tasks is difficult enough, the success of Russian labor in 
effecting policy change has become a complicating factor in the historical tendencies of 
policy creation in Russia. As noted, unions have become adept at using parliamentary 
factions in coordination with street protests to pressure legislators to water down 
proposed reforms or to gain more favorable terms. Given the wide pattern of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 For a good discussion of the negligible long-run productivity advantages of stimulus 
spending on infrastructure see Hulten, Charles; Schwab, Robert. “Infrastructure 
Spending: Where Do We Go From Here?” National Tax Journal 1993. Indeed, short-
term capital and infrastructure investment will simply increase the level of those 
employed, but will not change overall productivity, which is the determinant of long-term 
economic wealth per the Solow model. 
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mismatched expectations and increased volatility in state employment, one can expect 
white-collar unions to push further and to become more active in their activities. This will 
considerably limit the ability of the state to make necessary trade-offs in stagnating 
economic conditions or in making necessary long-term investments. To evaluate how the 
Russian state can cope with this increased difficulty in making trade-offs between labor 
groups, the comparative context is quite instructional.  
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VII.  White-Collar Unions Activity in the Comparative Perspective 
 
The findings above raise the question of whether this approach to relations between 
white-collar unions and the state is replicated in other contexts. For example, in Central 
and Eastern Europe, as in Russia, white-collar labor is represented in larger unions. 
Additionally, most unionized white-collar labor, especially in healthcare and education, is 
on the state’s payroll which leads to a fascinating comparative opportunity between 
Russia and the European cases examined prior. 
 
Russia appears to lie in a space between Poland, with its coopted unions, and the Czech 
Republic, with its somewhat effective and consolidated union structure.  Hence, to 
analyze white-collar unions, analyzing just the Polish and Czech context would be most 
instructive, as the multiplicity of Hungarian unions would not fit the organization of 
white-collar unions in Russia and would limit the comparative potential. 
 
Poland 
 
Despite similarities between Russian, Polish, and Czech labor, the institutional setting 
makes a tremendous difference in the efficacy of white-collar labor. In Poland especially, 
sectors of white-collar labor have been effective in subverting policies by using their 
position in the union as a whole. The clearest example of this was in 1993 when the 
nonindustrial public sector organized a protest of 1.1 million people. 79 Unhappy with the 
rightward shift on which Solidarity had begun to take the country, the Solidarity teachers’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Ekiert, Grzegorz; Kubik, Jan Rebellious Civil Society. 142 
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union began a protest before students’ final exams and demanded decreasing fiscal 
austerity measures and further increasing wages. Over the course of its months-long 
protest, the teachers’ union had convinced other nonindustrial public sector workers to 
join, culminating in a vote of no confidence in the Sejm and an end to Solidarity’s period 
of rule in Poland. 80.  
 
This is similar to Russian patterns of white-collar labor protest over the past decade. As 
the study indicates, nonindustrial state workers often protest together, putting additional 
pressure on the government. While Russia is a hybrid democracy and would not tolerate a 
general strike and government change like in Poland in 1993, the unions’ ability to effect 
tangible change is still potent, as seen by the Russian government’s policy concessions 
following the 2013 Russian Academy of Sciences protests. 
 
Other than the nature of the state, competition may be another factor affecting the 
efficacy of white-collar unions. Whereas the teachers’ unions in Russia are generally part 
of the FNPR, there is the teachers’ union under Solidarity and an independent teachers’ 
union in Poland, the ZNP.  The ZNP initiated strikes in schools in 1992 81 before the 
Solidarity teachers’ union initiated its protest in 1993. Hence, while the larger union 
structures such as the OPZZ and Solidarity are heavily influenced by the government, it 
seems that the smaller unions tends to be more radicalized, which differs from the 
Russian context. Participating in such protests may be a form of competition for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid., 142 - 148 
81 Ibid., 110 
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members, in line with Sil’s thesis that “inter-union competition within the same sector” 82 
may raise visibility, heightening this contest. This increased drive for members may 
indicate union effectiveness, initiating a cycle of increased membership and leading to 
more power in the state-labor power dynamic which Avdagic discussed. 83 
 
However, there are limitations to the Polish example when looking at the most recent 
source of tension between the Russian government and labor – healthcare. Healthcare 
workers tend to be in Solidarity or OPZZ 84 and due to the lack of coordination between 
the unions, they struggle to present a united front, leading to few policy changes in a 
nation where low pay for healthcare workers is a chronic problem 85. Considering that the 
other professional unions in Russia came out in support of the healthcare workers in the 
late-2014 protests 86, when looking at healthcare reforms, the Polish case may indicate 
what not to do. 
 
This promotes Sil’s point that inter-union competition is good but only if directed at 
political parties in a coordinated way. Without a clear message, even strikes will not lead 
to significant results. Additionally, it is hard to use the Polish context as a “forecast” for 
the future of white-collar efficacy in Russia due to the differing institutional contexts. For 
example, while Russians mostly rely on the state for healthcare spending, Poland began 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Sil. “Liberalization and Labor Incorporation” 29 
83 Avdagic 45 - 47 
84 Sitek, Michał. “Politics and Institutions in the Reforms of Health Care in the Czech 
Republic,  Hungary, and Poland”, 50 
85 Ibid. 
86 The teachers union joined in the protest on November 30th. (“Aktsiya protesta medikov 
nachalas’ v Moskve” [The healthcare workers’ protest began in Moscow] Kommersant, 
30 November 2014) 
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to embark on privatization in the 2000s 87.  
 
The Czech Republic 
 
In contrast to the Polish example, the Czech Republic illustrates a very similar framework 
of labor activity akin to the methods currently used in Moscow. Like in Russia, the Czech 
Republic relies on a trilateral council, Rada hospodářské a sociální dohod (RHSD), to 
handle industrial relations with ČMKOS. When unions realized in the late-1990s that this 
format was not going to lead to any gains, they behaved like organized labor in Russia. 
Like the FNPR, ČMKOS lobbied legislators and relied on formal constitutional methods 
to promote their agenda. Additionally, to press legislators, ČMKOS organized mass 
protests to demonstrate its size and reach, similar to how Russian unions behaved. 88 
 
Additionally, there is a great deal to be gained by analyzing the Czech context in the 
recent financial crisis. While according to Myant, “mobilization has consistently proven 
easiest over issues of employment law and that has protected much of the legislation 
passed in 1990,” 89 it is still relevant to compare how the labor reacted when the state and 
main negotiating parties were facing the same resource constraints as Russia’s 
government was in the prior section’s analysis.  
 
Unlike the Russian context, most Czech professional unions deal directly with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Sitek 50 
88 Myant, Martin. “Trade unions in the Czech Republic”, 22 
89 Myant, Martin. “The impact of the economic crisis on collective bargaining in the 
Czech Republic” European Review of Labour and Research, 188 
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enterprises, involving the government as part of the wider trilateral framework. However, 
despite this, the same low wage- high employment trade-off existed, with unions 
successfully pushing to maintain employment levels in lieu of wage increases.   
 
Likewise, Czech organized labor demonstrated the same inter-sector solidarity that 
characterized the Russian context. Indeed, as Glassner noted, “unions [preferred to pursue 
a strategy protecting [their] highly skilled core workforces.” 90  During the economic 
downturn in the late 2000s, the Czechs fought to maintain the same institutional 
arrangement as had been present prior to the crisis, and because enterprises, rather than 
the state had to shoulder the burden of making a trade-off, labor demonstrations were not 
as persistent nor as targeted as recent demonstrations in Moscow. 
 
However, a key difference between the Czech and Russian contexts is that ČMKOS relies 
on the persistence of narrow majorities in parliament to make themselves a very 
important political actor due to their ability to affect elections and push the government to 
make concessions. 91 The FNPR and its constituent unions are not as powerful, as there 
are less marginal situations to exploit because United Russia currently has a majority and 
had a super-majority prior to the 2011 Duma elections. 92 Additionally, Russia is a super-
presidential system in which the President can dismiss parliament, propose legislation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Glassner, Vera. “Central and eastern European industrial relations in the crisis: national 
divergence and path-dependent change.” Transfer: European Review of Labour., 165 
91 Ibid. 
92 There are also significant barriers to entry in the political system as detailed in Kynev, 
Aleksandr. “State Duma elections 2011 and marginal role of Russian parties.” 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/state-duma-elections-2011-and-the-
marginal-role-of-russian-parties-part-1/ 
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manage regional relations, and call for referenda93, whereas the Czech Republic is a 
parliamentary democracy, heightening the power of any actor that can make a marginal 
change between narrow majorities in parliament. Given this different political setting, it 
would be difficult to map the Czech experience of white-collar unions extracting 
concessions on to the Russian context. 
 
Thus, it seems that directly comparing Poland and the Czech Republic’s experiences of 
political struggles between white-collar unions and the state to Russia’s may be flawed as 
Russia seems to occupy a middle ground between these two frameworks. Even though 
Russian white-collar unions have less power than their counterparts in the Czech 
Republic, they are able to use their hybrid strategy to extract concessions from the 
government, which has been more successful than the Polish unions’ record.  
 
However, the institutional arrangement may yield insight on how the Russian government 
can avoid dealing with the employment-wage tradeoffs and the rising expectations. 
Rather than making unions institutional actors, the state could extricate itself from labor-
enterprise relations, fragmenting the focus of union efforts. For example, due to the local 
nature of labor-enterprise negotiations in the Czech Republic, there was less political 
drama and both parties, the unions and enterprises, tended to come to an agreement.94 
This union fragmentation and movement towards a more American or Western European 
notion of industrial relations may allow the Russian state to concentrate power further 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Sheinis, Viktor; Ed. M. McFaul. “The Constitution” Between Democracy and 
Dictatorship  67 - 71 
94 Myant, “The impact of the economic crisis on collective bargaining in the Czech 
Republic” 
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due to the relatively weaker unions that would result from the lack of coordination and 
cohesion. 
 
Advanced Industrial Capitalist States 
 
Is this move towards Western industrial relations possible, and if so, what will it entail? 
Upon comparing white-collar unions’ activity in the East and Central European and 
developed capitalistic contexts it appears that a “convergence” with the West would be 
divorced from reality. Russia and its peers in this study entered the 1990s with most 
professionals in unions which is a contrast to the western norm of white-collar workers 
not being part of unions. Due to a different legacy of unionization and different 
institutional roles for white-collar unions in the post-communist and developed capitalist 
contexts, it is clear that post-communist countries cannot truly emulate Western industrial 
relation frameworks. 
 
Unlike the union models seen in the prior sections, the West has certain white-collar 
workers in professional associations and others in unions. As seen in Lipset’s analysis of 
teacher unionization in the USA, 3.3 million teachers are in unions, split between the 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT), which identifies as a union, and the National 
Education Association (NEA), which identifies as a professional association. 95 The latter 
did not collectively bargain at first, but now acts like a union, using all of the tools ay its 
disposal.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Unions among White-Collar Employees and Professionals” 
15 
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This aversion to striking and collective bargaining seems to be a tendency found in 
Western unions that cater to professionals.  As seen in the discussion of unionizing 
healthcare workers, doctors’ strong professional identification is found to negatively 
correlate with unionization 96 and the American Medical Association even goes as far as 
to discourage striking, removing the force of any potential union. 97  
 
Even in new sectors filled with white-collar unions, there tends to be hesitance to engage 
in traditional union activities.  As seen in Jaarsveld’s case of the WashTech/CWA 
union’s activities in Washington state involving workers from companies like Amazon 
and Microsoft, attempts at unionization resulted in lay-offs and outsourcing of IT and 
white-collar jobs. 98  In response, it seems that high-tech unions tend to resemble 
professional organizations more than unions as they cannot use collective action against 
enterprises and rely more on political action, such as lobbying99, and mutual aid 100.  
 
As seen in the Washington case, in areas with developed service sectors, including tech, 
the ability to outsource work functions considerably increases, presenting a new 
challenge to the feasibility of white-collar unionization. In a study on the outsourcing 
decision, Teng et. al indicate that if employers felt that their employees were not 
delivering desired quality for the cost, they were likely to outsource the jobs if this was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96  Ibid., 22 
97  Ibid., 21 
98 Van Jaarsveld, Danielle D. “Collective Representation Among High-Tech Workers at 
Microsoft and Beyond: Lessons from WashTech/CWA” 374 
99  Ibid., ,376 
100 Ibid., 374 
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still consistent with overall strategic orientation. 101 Given the ability of high-tech and 
white-collar employees to outsource functions and still focus on core services, this 
indicates that in Western Europe 102 and in the United States, outsourcing is a significant 
threat to the ability of unions to pose a threat in the service sector, as employers may 
view this as a rise in labor costs.  
 
However, the larger context of white-collar unions indicates that unlike the cases 
presented in prior sections, Western white-collar unions deal with enterprises rather than 
the state, raising the question of comparative value. While in certain contexts, like the 
healthcare unions in the Czech Republic, there is evidence of increased interaction 
between enterprises and labor103, this is still not the norm. Additionally, as indicated by 
Kshetri, the countries in this case are beneficiaries of outsourcing efforts by more 
developed economies104 and have limited outsourcing themselves indicating that there is 
limited applicability of the experiences of Western white-collar unions. 
 
While Russia, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic are trying to converge with the 
West in many spheres 105, their unique white-collar union structures, as a result of their 
communist history, make it difficult to learn much from their Western partners. As many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Teng, James T.C.; Cheon, Myun Joong; Grover, Varun.. “Decisions to Outsource 
Information System Functions: Testing a Strategy – Theoretic Discrepancy Model”, 97- 
98 
102 Kshetri, Nir. “Institutional factors affecting offshore business sprocess and 
ifnromation technology outsourcing”, 49 
103 Sitek 48 
104 Kshetri 48 
105 Kubicek 52-53. Here Kubicek discusses Central and East European ambitions to 
converge with the West. 
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of the white-collar unions explored in this work represent state workers, the dynamic 
promoted by Avdagic between the state and labor is more appropriate than the traditional 
worker-enterprise dynamics which are common in Western labor.  
 
However, both the post-communist and the developed capitalistic contexts indicate that 
white-collar labor is not quiescent. While the methods employed differ by sector in the 
West and by country in Central and Eastern Europe, white-collar labor resilience and the 
ability to extract concessions by exploiting existing institutions is noticeable.  Whereas in 
Central and Eastern Europe, successful unions attempt to strengthen their power relative 
to the state, in the Western context, successful white-collar unions do the same, as seen in 
the lobbying efforts of WashTech 106 or the teachers’ union use of strikes 107. By using 
this dynamic relationship, unions in both contexts have shown that they are not sclerotic 
institutions but are quite responsive to shifting power dynamics and capable of exhibiting 
institutional learned behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Jaarsveld 376 
107 Lipset 14 – 15. Lipset discusses how the NEA overcame its reluctance and now 
embraces strikes and collective bargaining as political tools. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
This study has shown that the dogs really did bark. When disaggregating white-collar 
labor demonstrations from overall union activity, one sees that workers on the state 
payroll such as academics, teachers, and doctors are quite vocal in their demands. More 
importantly, these groups have faced increasingly more success as the period under study 
progressed. Whereas the government seemed to ignore these workers’ demands at first, 
there is already evidence of modifications being made to reform proposals following 
white-collar unions using new tactics. 
 
When protesting, these unions continued to take to the streets to indicate that they had 
power and were able to mobilize support, per Avdagic’s dynamic state-labor model. 
However, what led to concessions is the willingness to work within existing mechanisms 
to achieve success. Just like the FNPR lobbied and relied on deputies from different 
parties to support their changes to the labor code in 2002, the white-collar unions also 
relied on political means to lobby for change.  
 
The larger comparative study indicates that this is quite similar to the Czech case, where 
a unified union structure was able to coalesce white-collar workers into one union, and 
using similar tactics, press for measures that were friendlier to labor. However, this 
investigation leaves many questions that require further investigation. First, further work 
is called for on the disconnect between formal and informal implementation. As seen in 
the reforms of the Russian Academy of Sciences, while there were few formal changes 
made to the reforms, the informal concessions completely changed the tenor of the 
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reforms and gave the academics more power.  
 
Additionally, it will be important to note how union movements progress in the Russian 
Federation. If the argument of “learned behavior” is correct, then unions will continue to 
take to the streets and use political means to promote policy changes. However, if this 
remains effective as the government learns as well or if this remains the dominant state-
labor dynamic will give the comparative context more relevance. 
 
Currently the state of white-collar labor in Russia appears to be between Polish and 
Czech labor relations, in that it is able to make marginal changes and isn’t entirely 
coopted by the state. Seeing how the dynamic evolves over the coming years will be 
important, as it may have important consequences on the ability of the state to pass 
economic legislation and on labor’s ability to get favorable conditions. Indeed, the 
hypotheses on labor mobilization that were discussed in the Moscow context indicate that 
the Russian state will need to begin to change the terms of the state-labor dynamic in 
order to facilitate tough choices it faces.  
 
Faced with stagnation and the need to promote productivity, the Russian government may 
choose to facilitate inter-union rivalry, as there appears to be one subset of labor that is 
aggrieved  (the white-collar unions) and another which is content with the economic 
progress thus far. As it is difficult to change the former’s frame of reference, the 
government may attempt to further weaken unions and specifically the biudzhetniki’s 
unions in order to be able to effectively enact policy without needing to deal with the 
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political maneuvering of the white-collar unions. 
 
Even in the West, where there was not a legacy of unionized white-collar labor, unions 
have found ways to effect change and strive for better conditions for their members, 
indicating that the Russian state will face difficulties if it attempts the strategy above. 
This study and the comparative analysis are indicative of the larger pattern of labor being 
active while adapting to institutional settings. While this adaptability is sure to lead to 
many more duels between the state and organized labor, it makes clear that unions are not 
“quiescent” and have some bite to their bark. 
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Appendix I:  Aggregate Union Protests in Moscow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
ate 
U
nion 
Pro- G
overnm
ent 
A
nti- G
overnm
ent 
C
ause of Protest 
2/26/01 
Profsoyuz predprinim
atelei (Entrepreneurs' U
nion) 
 
  
To prevent audio store closing 
2/28/01 
Profsoyuz rabotnikov obrazovanie (Teachers's U
nion) 
 
  
C
alled for adm
inistration resignation 
and pay raises 
9/28/01 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
For m
ore funding 
4/11/02 
Studenticheskie profsoyuzy (Students' U
nion) 
 
  
For m
ore attention to student concerns 
6/25/02 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
For m
ore funding 
2/27/03 
Profsoyuz rabotnikov neproizvodstvennoi sfery (N
on-
industrial w
orkers' union) 
 
  
A
gainst the unified social tax 
10/15/03 
Profsoyuz rabotnikov neproizvodstvennoi sfery (N
on-
industrial w
orkers' union) 
 
  
For higher w
ages 
7/30/04 
Profsoyuzy uchenykh, studentov, I aviadispetcherov 
(The Scientists, Students, and A
ir D
ispatchers' U
nions) 
 
  
Protest against exchanging benefits for 
cash 
10/1/04 
Studenticheskie profsoyuzy (Students' U
nion) 
 
  
A
gainst paying for higher education 
10/20/04 
Profsoyuzy biudzhetnikov I prepodavatelei (The 
B
udget W
orkers and Teachers' U
nions) 
 
  
For m
ore funding 
4/27/05 
Studenticheskie profsoyuzy (Students' U
nion) 
 
  
A
gainst education reform
s 
5/25/05 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
C
alled for the resignation of A
ndrei 
Fursenko 
!
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D
ate 
U
nion 
Pro- G
overnm
ent 
A
nti- 
G
overnm
ent 
C
ause of Protest 
7/30/04 
Profsoyuzy uchenykh, studentov, I 
aviadispetcherov (The Scientists, 
Students, and A
ir D
ispatchers' U
nions) 
 
  
Protest against exchanging benefits 
for cash 
9/13/04 
M
oskovskaya federatsiya profsoyuzov 
(M
oscow
 Federation of Trade U
nions) 
  
 
A
gainst terrorism
 
10/20/04 
FN
PR
 
 
  
H
igher w
ages for teacher, healthcare 
w
orkers 
3/30/05 
R
ossiiskii profsoyuz lokom
otivnykh 
brigad zheleznodorozhnikov (The 
R
ussian U
nion of R
ailroad W
orkers) 
 
!!
C
onsider the labor agreem
ent unfair 
5/1/04 
FN
PR
 
!!
 
M
ay 1st D
em
onstration 
5/25/05 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian 
A
cadem
y of Sciences) 
 
  
C
alled for the resignation of A
ndrei 
Fursenko 
9/23/05 
Profsoyuzy Predpriyatii oboronno-
prom
yshlennogo kom
pleksa (D
efense 
Industry W
orkers' U
nions) 
 
  
To w
rite off the debt and fines for 
m
ilitary hardw
are m
anufacturers 
from
 the 90s 
10/13/05 
Profsoyuzy rabotnikov obrazoaniya, 
zdravokhraneniya, I studentov (The 
Teachers, H
ealthcare W
orkers, and 
Students' U
nions) 
 
  
To increase w
ages and for the 
governm
ent to resign 
11/29/05 
Profsouz rabotnikov 
agroprom
ishlennogo kom
pleksa 
(A
gricultural W
orkers' U
nion) 
 
!!
To increase support for R
ussian 
agriculture, for G
erm
an G
ref to 
resign 
5/1/06 
FN
PR
 
  
 
M
ay 1st D
em
onstration w
ith U
R
 
!
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D
ate 
U
nion 
Pro- G
overnm
ent 
A
nti- 
G
overnm
ent 
C
ause of Protest 
5/26/06 
Profsoyuz voditilei (The drivers' 
union) 
 
  
A
gainst M
Ps having em
ergency 
vehicle lights allow
ing them
 to 
violate traffic rules 
10/14/06 
Profsoyuz voditilei (The drivers' 
union) 
  
 
M
PV
P protests aganst high gasoline 
prices and low
 quality 
4/11/07 
FN
PR
 
 
  
FN
PR
 dem
ands pension raises 
5/1/07 
FN
PR
 
!!
 
M
ay 1st D
em
onstration 
5/1/09 
FN
PR
 
  
 
M
ay 1st D
em
onstration 
10/8/08 
FN
PR
 
  
 
Protest for higher w
ages and against 
G
eorgia 
5/1/09 
FN
PR
 
  
 
M
ay 1st D
em
onstration 
5/1/10 
FN
PR
 
  
 
M
ay 1st D
em
onstration 
4/1/11 
Federal'ny profsoyuz aviadispetcherov 
I profsoyuzy voditilei I m
oryakov 
(The Federal U
nion of A
ir 
D
ispatchers, the Sailors and D
rivers' 
U
nions) 
 
  
For higher w
ages and increased 
w
orker rights 
5/1/11 
FN
PR
 
  
 
M
ay 1st D
em
onstration 
8/5/11 
Profsoyuz voditilei (The drivers' 
union) 
 
  
Protest against gasoline prices 
9/6/11 
Stolichny I m
ezhregional'ny profsoyuz 
taksistov (C
apital and Interregional 
U
nion of Taxi D
rivers) 
 
  
Protest against regulations 
12/12/11 
FN
PR
 
  
 
In support of Putin 
!
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D
ate 
U
nion 
Pro- G
overnm
ent 
A
nti- 
G
overnm
ent 
C
ause of Protest 
2/4/12 
M
ezhregional'ny profsoyuz rabotnikov 
obrazovania, M
ezhregional'ny 
profsoyuz taksistov, nezavisim
ye 
profsoyuzy (The Interregional 
Teachers and Taxi D
rivers U
nions, 
Independent U
nions) 
!!
 
In support of Putin 
5/1/12 
FN
PR
 
  
 
M
ay 1st D
em
onstration 
8/9/12 
Stolichny I m
ezhregional'ny profsoyuz 
taksistov (C
apital and Interregional 
U
nion of Taxi D
rivers) 
 
  
For exceptions to certain traffic law
s 
from
 taxi drivers 
10/7/12 
K
TR
, Profsoyuzi uchitelei, 
aviadispetcherov, I sotrudnikov 
zavodov (K
TR
, the Teachers, A
ir 
D
ispathcers, and Secretaries' U
nions) 
 
  
Social benefit policy reform
 
5/1/13 
FN
PR
 
  
 
M
ay 1st D
em
onstration 
8/24/13 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian 
A
cadem
y of Sciences) 
 
  
A
gainst R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences reform
s 
9/10/13 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian 
A
cadem
y of Sciences) 
 
  
A
gainst R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences reform
s 
5/1/14 
FN
PR
 
  
 
M
ay 1st D
em
onstration 
11/2/14 
M
ezhregional'ny Profsoyuz 
M
editsinskih rabotnikov (Interregional 
H
ealthcare W
orkers' U
nion) 
 
  
A
gainst m
edical reform
s 
11/30/14 
Profsoyuz M
editsinskih rabotnikov 
(The H
ealthcare W
orkers' U
nion) 
 
  
A
gainst m
edical reform
s 
!
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Appendix II: White- Collar Union Protests in Moscow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
ate 
U
nion 
Pro- G
overnm
ent 
A
nti- G
overnm
ent 
C
ause of Protest 
2/26/01 
Profsoyuz predprinim
atelei (Entrepreneurs' U
nion) 
 
  
To prevent audio store closing 
2/28/01 
Profsoyuz rabotnikov obrazovanie (Teachers's U
nion) 
 
  
C
alled for adm
inistration resignation 
and pay raises 
9/28/01 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
For m
ore funding 
4/11/02 
Studenticheskie profsoyuzy (Students' U
nion) 
 
  
For m
ore attention to student concerns 
6/25/02 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
For m
ore funding 
2/27/03 
Profsoyuz rabotnikov neproizvodstvennoi sfery (N
on-
industrial w
orkers' union) 
 
  
A
gainst the unified social tax 
10/15/03 
Profsoyuz rabotnikov neproizvodstvennoi sfery (N
on-
industrial w
orkers' union) 
 
  
For higher w
ages 
7/30/04 
Profsoyuzy uchenykh, studentov, I aviadispetcherov 
(The Scientists, Students, and A
ir D
ispatchers' U
nions) 
 
  
Protest against exchanging benefits for 
cash 
10/1/04 
Studenticheskie profsoyuzy (Students' U
nion) 
 
  
A
gainst paying for higher education 
10/20/04 
Profsoyuzy biudzhetnikov I prepodavatelei (The 
B
udget W
orkers and Teachers' U
nions) 
 
  
For m
ore funding 
4/27/05 
Studenticheskie profsoyuzy (Students' U
nion) 
 
  
A
gainst education reform
s 
5/25/05 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
C
alled for the resignation of A
ndrei 
Fursenko 
!
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D
ate 
U
nion 
Pro- G
overnm
ent 
A
nti- G
overnm
ent 
C
ause of Protest 
9/23/05 
Profsoyuzy Predpriyatii oboronno-prom
yshlennogo 
kom
pleksa (D
efense Industry W
orkers' U
nions) 
 
  
To w
rite off the debt and fines for 
m
ilitary hardw
are m
anufacturers from
 
the 90s 
10/12/05 
Profsoyuz rabotnikov neproizvodstvennoi sfery (N
on-
industrial w
orkers' union) 
 
  
To call for higher salaries 
10/13/05 
Profsoyuzy rabotnikov obrazovaniya, 
zdravokhraneniya, I studentov (The Teachers, 
H
ealthcare W
orkers, and Students' U
nions) 
 
  
To increase w
ages and for the 
governm
ent to resign 
5/24/05 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
A
gainst reform
s 
5/13/10 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
For m
ore funding 
10/21/10 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
For m
ore funding 
4/1/11 
Federal'ny profsoyuz aviadispetcherov I profsoyuzy 
voditilei I m
oryakov (The Federal U
nion of A
ir 
D
ispatchers, the Sailors and D
rivers' U
nions) 
 
  
For higher w
ages and increased w
orker 
rights 
10/13/11 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
For m
ore funding 
2/4/12 
Federal'ny profsoyuz aviadispetcherov I profsoyuzy 
voditilei I m
oryakov (The Federal U
nion of A
ir 
D
ispatchers, the Sailors and D
rivers' U
nions) 
  
 
In support of Putin 
10/7/12 
K
TR
, Profsoyuzi uchitelei, aviadispetcherov, I 
sotrudnikov zavodov (K
TR
, the Teachers, A
ir 
D
ispatchers, and Secretaries' U
nions) 
 
  
Social benefit policy reform
 
4/20/13 
Profsoyuz rabotnikov zdravokhraneniya (The 
H
ealthcare W
orkers' U
nion) 
 
  
For changes in healthcare policy 
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D
ate 
U
nion 
Pro- G
overnm
ent 
A
nti- G
overnm
ent 
C
ause of Protest 
5/26/13 
M
ezhregional'ny Profsoyuz predprinim
atelei 
(Interregional Entrepreneurs' U
nion) 
 
  
For less governm
ent regulation of sm
all 
business 
7/2/13 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
A
gainst R
ussian A
cadem
y of Sciences 
reform
s 
8/24/13 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
A
gainst R
ussian A
cadem
y of Sciences 
reform
s 
8/25/13 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
A
gainst R
ussian A
cadem
y of Sciences 
reform
s 
9/10/13 
Profsoyuz R
A
N
 (U
nion of the R
ussian A
cadem
y of 
Sciences) 
 
  
A
gainst R
ussian A
cadem
y of Sciences 
reform
s 
10/11/14 
Profsoyuz U
chitelei (The Teachers' U
nion) 
 
  
A
gainst governm
ent plans on school 
financing 
10/25/14 
Profsoyuz U
chitelei (The Teachers' U
nion) 
 
  
In support of free education and calling 
for resignation of M
oscow
 education 
head 
11/2/14 
M
ezhregional'ny Profsoyuz M
editsinskih rabotnikov 
(Interregional H
ealthcare W
orkers' U
nion) 
 
  
A
gainst m
edical reform
s 
11/30/14 
Profsoyuz M
editsinskih rabotnikov (The H
ealthcare 
W
orkers' U
nion) 
 
  
A
gainst m
edical reform
s 
!
